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THE NEW FICTION:
DRED SCOTT AND THE LANGUAGE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
MARK A. GRABER*
Supreme Court Justices at the turn of the twenty-first century an-
nounce constitutional limits on federal and state power by declaring federal
and state laws unconstitutional. Opinions restraining federal and state offi-
cials routinely include such phrases as "[w]e hold that the Act exceeds the
authority of Congress"' or "[w]e hold that the congressional veto provision
in § 244(c)(2) ... is unconstitutional."' 2 The Supreme Court declares laws
unconstitutional in cases limiting federal authority3 and in cases limiting
state authority. 4 The same language is found in opinions striking down laws
that enjoy substantial popular support5 and in opinions striking down laws
of interest only to a few specialists. 6 Both liberal and conservative Justices
assert "this law is unconstitutional" when imposing constitutional limits on
government power. 7
* Professor of Law and Government, University of Maryland School of Law and University of
Maryland, College Park. Much thanks to Sandy Levinson, Jack Balkin, and Paul Finkelman for organiz-
ing this symposium, to Michael McConnell for comments on an early version of this paper, and to the
Chicago-Kent Law Review for their help and forbearance.
1. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
2. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004) ("The Court held the CDA unconstitu-
tional because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest and because less
restrictive alternatives were available.").
4. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 432 (2005)
("[B]ecause Michigan's fee is flat, it discriminates against interstate carriers and imposes an unconstitu-
tional burden upon interstate trade.").
5. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (declaring the Violence Against
Women Act unconstitutional on the ground that "Congress' effort in § 13981 to provide a federal civil
remedy can be sustained neither under the Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment").
6. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding that "[s]ection 27A(b)"
of the Securities Act of 1934 "is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen
final judgments entered before its enactment").
7. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (majority opinion by Justice Steven
Breyer asserting, "We hold that this statute violates the Constitution"); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (majority opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist asserting, "This case pre-
sents the question whether applying New Jersey's public accommodations law in this way violates the
Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association. We hold that it does.").
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The consistency with which contemporary Justices pen these and simi-
lar expressions when announcing constitutional limits on government
power may explain why contemporary scholars measure judicial activism
by counting the number of cases in which judicial opinions assert that a
state or federal law is unconstitutional. The canonical list of Supreme Court
decisions exercising the power of judicial review is limited to "Supreme
Court [d]ecisions [h]olding [a]cts of [c]ongress [u]nconstitutional in
[w]hole or in [p]art" and "Supreme Court [d]ecisions [h]olding [s]tate
[c]onstitutional and [s]tatutory [p]rovisions and [m]unicipal [o]rdinances
[u]nconstitutional on [t]heir [f]ace or as [a]dministered." 8 The Supreme
Court "database lists only decisions in which the Court clearly indicates
that it has voided a legislative enactment." 9 One consequence of this cate-
gorization scheme is that Roe v. Wade is universally considered an instance
when the Justices exercised the power of judicial review, while no one
considers Kentucky v. Dennison an instance when the Justices exercised
that power. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe concluded that the
Texas "statute ... cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it
here."' 10 Chief Justice Roger Taney's opinion in Dennison concluded that
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 should not be interpreted as imposing a
legal duty on state officials to extradite fugitives from justice." 1 Dennison
is not considered an instance where the judiciary announced constitutional
limits of federal power even though Taney openly disregarded the plain
meaning of the Fugitive Slave Act only because he believed that the meas-
ure, if interpreted literally, was unconstitutional. 12 Equating judicial review
with the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional, scholars determine
whether particular Courts or Justices are activist or restrained by the num-
ber of opinions issued striking down state and federal laws. Tom Keck
asserts that William Rehnquist presided over "the most activist court in
American history," because the Justices from 1994 to 2005 declared uncon-
stitutional more federal laws than any previous tribunal. 13 Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas are thought to be particularly activist because
they vote to strike down more federal laws than their peers. 14
8. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 144, 148 (2d ed. 1996).
9. Id. at 147.
10. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 167.
11. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 106-07 (1861).
12. See id. at 16-07.
13. THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 40-41, 203-15 (2004).
14. See id. at 251 tbl.6.5.
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The Supreme Court before the Civil War seems decidedly less activist
than contemporary Courts when judicial activism is measured by how often
the Justices assert they are striking down federal laws. Only two majority
opinions issued from 1791 until 1864 explicitly declared a federal law un-
constitutional. The first was Marbury v. Madison.15 Chief Justice John
Marshall's opinion for the Court in that case plainly stated that Section 13
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was inconsistent with Article III. "The author-
ity ... given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts
of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers," Mar-
shall asserted, "appears not to be warranted by the constitution ...." He
then famously asked, "whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can
become the law of the land .... "16 His answer was a resounding no.17
Dred Scott v. Sandford18 was the other decision handed down before the
Civil War in which Supreme Court Justices explicitly asserted that Con-
gress had passed an unconstitutional law. Chief Justice Roger Taney's
opinion in that case stated, "[I]t is the opinion of the court that the act of
Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of
this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein men-
tioned, is not warranted by the Constitution.... ."19 Two concurring opin-
ions made similar declarations. Justice Grier asserted, "[T]he act of
Congress of 6th March, 1820, is unconstitutional and void .... "20 "Mr.
Justice Nelson," Justice Wayne commented, "abstains altogether from ex-
pressing any opinion upon the eighth section of the act of 1820, known
commonly as the Missouri Compromise law, and six of us declare that it
was unconstitutional.'
Dred Scott is commonly reviled for abandoning this apparent judicial
practice of "invariable and virtually complete deference" to "general fed-
eral legislation. '22 Critics of the majority opinions frequently point to the
fifty-four year gap between judicial decisions declaring federal laws uncon-
stitutional. 23 Although constitutional debates over national power wracked
15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16. Id. at 176.
17. See id. at 180.
18. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
19. Id. at 452.
20. Id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 455 (Wayne, J., concurring).
22. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 213 (2004). See generally MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 23-24 (2006) (noting institutional criticisms of the Dred Scott decision).




antebellum America, 24 neither the Marshall nor Taney Courts declared any
provision in the federal code unconstitutional between 1803 and 1856. The
judicial decision to strike down the Missouri Compromise, in this view,
was a dramatic and unwarranted break with an almost unbroken tradition of
judicial passivity in cases raising questions of federal constitutional wrong.
Robert McCloskey describes that Taney Court ruling as "one dramatic
lapse from judicial self-restraint. '25 "Dred Scott stuck out like a sore
thumb," Larry Kramer states, "partly because it was so unprecedented for
the Supreme Court to assert its will over and against Congress. '26
One problem with this consensus is that the Supreme Court before
Dred Scott probably did not adjudicate the number of cases raising ques-
tions of federal constitutional wrong necessary to exhibit "invariable and
virtually complete deference" to Congress or any other identifiable pattern
of judicial behavior. The Taney Court heard an average of less than two
appeals annually in which one party objected to a federal action on consti-
tutional grounds. Many of those cases were decided on non-constitutional
grounds. 27 The federal constitutional claims adjudicated on the merits con-
cerned matters of little political salience. With the exception of constitu-
tional issues associated with fugitive slaves and slavery in the territories, 28
the Taney Court was rarely ever asked to resolve any of the numerous fed-
eral constitutional questions that excited Americans during the three dec-
ades before the Civil War. Whigs and Democrats debated the constitutional
status of such matters as internal improvements, protective tariffs, national
expansion, and the Mexican War without any help from the federal judici-
ary.29 This dearth of judicial rulings sustaining or striking down federal
laws belies claims that any judicial tradition, activist or restrained, existed
at the time when Dred Scott was decided.30
24. See especially DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS,
1801-1829 (2001); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS,
1829-1861 (2005); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE
MAELSTROM, 1829-1861 (2005).
25. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 60 (Sanford Levinson rev., 4th ed.
2005).
26. KRAMER, supra note 22, at 213.
27. See Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
17, 28 (2000).
28. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539 (1842).
29. See Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's
Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 508-24 (2004).
30. Anticipated reactions do not explain the lack of constitutional litigation from 1835 to 1856.
Many commentators believe that the Taney Court would have imposed narrow limitations on federal
power if presented with the proper case. The Taney Court could not decide whether the major planks of
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The more serious problem with claims that the Justices in Dred Scott
abandoned a tradition of judicial restraint is that the standard measure
scholars use when determining judicial activism is anachronistic. Antebel-
lum Justices asserted that laws were unconstitutional only when restraining
state officials. Judicial etiquette, in their opinion, required more circum-
spection when imposing constitutional limits on a coordinate branch of the
national government. Contrary to accepted wisdom, the Justices before the
Civil War imposed constitutional limitations on federal power in approxi-
mately twenty cases. They did so, however, without explicitly declaring
federal legislation unconstitutional. The Justices in some federal cases ig-
nored the plain meaning of federal statutes on the ground that Congress
would always be presumed to have intended to act constitutionally, as con-
stitutionality was defined by the Supreme Court.31 In other cases, Justices
determined that the federal government could not constitutionally engage in
some activity without determining whether Congress by statute had author-
ized that activity. 32 These and other techniques were means by which the
Supreme Court could announce constitutional limits on the national gov-
ernment while pretending that no constitutional conflict was taking place
between national elected officials and federal Justices. The majority and
concurring opinions in Dred Scott broke with past judicial practice only by
explicitly declaring, when limiting federal power, that the national legisla-
ture had passed an unconstitutional law. Their actual ruling, if not their
language, was consistent with previous cases imposing constitutional limits
on the federal government.
This paper places in historical perspective the judicial decision in
Dred Scott to declare explicitly that the Missouri Compromise was uncon-
stitutional. Part I analyzes a speech made during the debates over the Re-
peal Act of 1802 in which Senator Gouverneur Morris of New York
predicted that the Supreme Court, when restraining federal power, would
never acknowledge that the national legislature had made a constitutional
mistake. Judicial opinions that interpreted or misinterpreted federal laws as
consistent with judicial understandings of federal authority, he insisted,
prevented the "hateful clashing of public authorities," and permitted jus-
tices to declare official constitutional meanings without "deny[ing]" the
"full supremacy" of Congress.33 Part II examines the approximately twenty
the American system were constitutional primarily because proposed measures were vetoed by Jackson-
ian presidents and, hence, never became law. See id. at 534-35.
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. See infra Part ll.B.
33. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 55 (1802).
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cases decided before the Civil War in which the Justices employed some
version of Gouverneur Morris's fiction when announcing constitutional
limits on federal power. While these cases are hardly sufficient to demon-
strate a tradition of judicial activism, they belie the common understanding
that the Taney Court before 1856 was committed to some version of judi-
cial minimalism.34 Part III hypothesizes why the Justices in the Dred Scott
majority may have broken with past practice and stated bluntly that a fed-
eral law was unconstitutional. The best explanation, the limited evidence
suggests, is that the Justices could not easily employ Gouverneur Morris's
fiction when adjudicating politically charged constitutional issues and that
Taney wished to "deny" as plainly as possible the "full supremacy" of a
future Republican majority. Taney's Dred Scott opinion, the conclusion
briefly suggests, may have substituted one legal fiction for another. Gou-
verneur Morris's fiction was a means by which the federal judiciary
claimed authority by minimizing the appearance of conflict between
elected officials and federal Justices. Roger Taney's fiction, the declaration
that the congressional majority had made a constitutional mistake, was a
means by which the federal judiciary claimed authority by exaggerating the
appearance of conflict between elected officials and federal Justices.
Taney's rhetorical strategy in Dred Scott for imposing constitutional
limits may have been a consequence of fundamental changes in American
constitutional politics. Gouverneur Morris's fiction could be plausibly em-
ployed only when the Justices were confident that Congress would not
challenge the legal ruling imposing constitutional limits on federal power.
Justices could pretend that they were merely carrying out the legislative
will when voiding land titles, for example, because little reason existed for
thinking that anyone in Congress cared about the disposition of the particu-
lar tract in dispute. The constitutional debates over the Missouri Compro-
mise excited the body public. Prominent political actors were aggressively
defending the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, and they were
unlikely to desist after the Supreme Court had pronounced their views
wrong. These political circumstances made relying on past rhetorical con-
ventions in Dred Scott problematic, because legislative acquiescence could
not be taken for granted. In light of the underlying politics, the decision to
use language previously employed only in judicial decisions restricting the
power of state governments and to declare the offending law unconstitu-
tional probably communicated three points to the antebellum audience
reading the majority opinions in Dred Scott. First, the Court recognized the
34. The classic discussion of judicial minimalism is CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
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bitter political debate over whether the Missouri Compromise was constitu-
tional. Second, the judicial decision was intended to settle that debate.
Third, those who championed bans on slavery in the territories were not
worthy of the respect the Justices had previously shown to national officials
who had merely made constitutional mistakes.
While rejecting language that minimized the appearance of conflict
between national elected officials and federal courts, Taney and his breth-
ren used language in their opinions that inflated the appearance of conflict
between national elected officials and federal courts. The judicial assertion
that "the act of Congress... is not warranted by the Constitution" strongly
implies that a constitutional disagreement existed between the present elec-
toral and judicial majorities. The Justices in 1857, a reasonable reader of
the Dred Scott opinions might believe, were challenging the dominant leg-
islative belief that Congress was constitutionally authorized to ban slavery
in the territories. Whether that disagreement actually existed in 1857 is
doubtful. No Justice in the Dred Scott majority noted that many elected
officials maintained that the Compromise of 1850 or the Kansas-Nebraska
Act of 1854 had repealed the Missouri Compromise, 35 that both those
measures contained provisions expediting appeals of any ruling on the con-
stitutionality of slavery in the territories, 36 and that President Buchanan had
privately endorsed the Dred Scott decision before that judicial ruling was
publicly announced. 37 While the judicial decision to state explicitly that
Congress had made a constitutional mistake suggests that the Justices were
"thwart[ing] the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and
now,' ' 38 the judicial ruling that slavery could not be prohibited in American
territories probably enjoyed as much legislative support as previous rulings
such as the holding that the federal government could not grant title to riv-
erbeds after a territory became a state.39 The roots of the counter-
majoritarian problem may lie more in changing rhetorical practices for
imposing constitutional limits on federal power than in any increased judi-
cial tendency to frustrate popular majorities.
35. See MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: JACKSONIAN
POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 806-21 (1999).
36. Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, §§ 9, 27, 10 Stat. 277, 280, 287 (1854); Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch.
49, § 10, 9 Stat. 446, 450; Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 9, 9 Stat. 453, 455-56.
37. See Philip Auchampaugh, James Buchanan, the Court and the Dred Scott Case, 9 TENN. HIST.
MAG. 231, 236-37 (1926). For a more general argument that the decision in Dred Scott was not
counter-majoritarian, see GRABER, supra note 22, at 30-35.
38. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 17 (1962).
39. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
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I. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS'S FICTION
Shortly after repealing the Judiciary Act of 1801, the Senate consid-
ered a memorial from eleven dispossessed federal judges, asking that they
be assigned judicial duties and be paid their judicial salaries.40 A three-
person committee, for some unknown reason composed entirely of Federal-
ists, was appointed to consider the petition. Its final report urged the Senate
to request that President Jefferson initiate a court action for the purpose of
determining whether the petitioners had been unconstitutionally deprived
of their offices. 41 Jeffersonians in the national legislature vigorously op-
posed this effort to have the Supreme Court determine the constitutionality
of the Repeal Act of 1802. Several Jeffersonians repeated claims made
during the debate over the Repeal Act that federal Justices had no power to
declare laws unconstitutional. 42 "Ought we to go to the courts and ask them
whether we have done our duty, or whether we have violated the Constitu-
tion," Senator Thomas Jackson of Georgia asked. Jackson, a good Jeffer-
sonian, thought the answer to this rhetorical question obvious. "[T]his
report of the committee" he asserted, is "contrary to the spirit of the Consti-
tution and Government of the country, and contrary to our own dignity." In
his view, "[t]he courts have no power to control the proceedings of the
Legislature or the Executive. '4
3
Senator Gouverneur Morris of New York responded to these Republi-
can fears by suggesting that the Supreme Court might support the dispos-
sessed federal justices without asserting that Congress had made a
constitutional mistake. "Will the judges rudely declare that you have vio-
lated the Constitution, unmindful of your duty, and regardless of your
oath?" he asked. "No." Morris did not anticipate that Chief Justice John
Marshall and his brethren would leave the midnight justices without a rem-
edy. Rather, Morris maintained, the Supreme Court would engage in statu-
tory misconstruction. Disregarding the plain language and obvious
intention of the Repeal Act, the Justices would hold that Congress had not
actually sought to deny the petitioners their judicial offices in violation of
Article III. "With that decency which becomes the judicial character," Mor-
ris declared,
40. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 30-31 (1803).
41. Id. at 51-52.
42. For a sampling of attacks on judicial review made during the debate over the Repeal Act, see
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 59, 61-63 (1802) (statement of Sen. Mason); id. at 73-74 (statement of Sen.
Stone); id. at 105 (statement of Sen. Baldwin); id. at 178-80 (statement of Sen. Breckenridge).
43. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 64 (1803).
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that decency which upholds national dignity and impresses obedience on
the public will; that decency, the handmaid of the graces, which more
adorns a magistrate than ermine, aye, than royal robes; with that decency
which so peculiarly befits their state and condition, they will declare
what the Legislature meant. They will never presume to believe, much
less to declare, that you meant to violate the Constitution. There will be
no dangerous and hateful clashing of public authorities. They will never
question the exercise of that high discretion with which you are invested.
They will not deny your full supremacy. They will not examine into your
motives, nor assign improper views. They will respect you so long as
they preserve a due respect for themselves. They will declare, that in as-
signing duties to one officer, and taking them from another, you have to
consult only your own convictions of what the interest or convenience of
the people may require.-They will modestly conclude, that you did not
mean to abolish the offices which the Constitution had forbidden you to
abolish; and, therefore, finding that it was not your intention to abolish,
they will declare that the offices still exist. Such, sir, would be the lan-
guage of your supreme Judiciary, from the high sense they entertain of
their duty. 44
By creatively interpreting federal law, the Justices would restore the
midnight justices to their offices without directly challenging federal legis-
lative authority over official constitutional meanings. In so doing, the Su-
preme Court would impose constitutional limits on national power without
declaring any federal measure unconstitutional.
Gouverneur Morris's fiction, in sharp contrast to the present practice
of explicitly declaring laws unconstitutional, minimized the appearance of
conflict between national elected officials and federal Justices. "There will
be no dangerous and hateful clashing of public authorities," Morris as-
serted. Justices who followed the recommended path would have never
declared that Congress had made a constitutional mistake that had to be
corrected by the federal judiciary. The national legislature was always pre-
sumed to have intended to act constitutionally, but those constitutional
standards were established by the federal judiciary. Statutory language is
interpreted with this precept in mind. Both plain meaning and legislative
history were ignored when these interpretive logics supported an unconsti-
tutional result. Courts that adopted the recommended precepts, Morris be-
lieved, would hold that Congress, when passing the Repeal Act of 1802,
did not intend to abolish judicial offices solely because Congress had no
constitutional authority to abolish judicial offices.
Justices who employed this rhetorical convention for placing constitu-
tional limits on federal power did not need to distinguish between judicial
review, the judicial power to determine whether a statute may be constitu-
44. Id. at 55-56.
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tionally applied to the parties before the Court, and judicial supremacy, the
judicial power to determine authoritatively what the Constitution means.
As Morris informed Congress, the Justices "will not deny your full su-
premacy." Federal statutes bound all citizens, including federal Justices.
These fetters, however, were remarkably loose because Justices interpret-
ing federal law would be licensed, no matter what the text or history of the
bill, to find that the measure mandated only federal actions the Justices
believed constitutional. Judicial opinions that employed this strategy
avoided raising questions about the actual division of constitutional author-
ity between the courts and the elected branches of the national government
because Congress was presumed never to have acted inconsistently with
constitutional standards laid out by the Supreme Court.
Rhetorical conventions that denied conflict between the legislative and
judicial branches were more embedded in notions of judicial etiquette than
judicial restraint. Justices, Morris believed, demonstrated respect for a co-
ordinate branch of the federal government by never explicitly asserting that
national elected officials had made a constitutional mistake. In his view, the
"decency which upholds the national dignity" meant that Justices should
"never presume to believe, much less to declare, that [Congress] meant to
violate the Constitution." This "decency" did not entail any deference to
legislative judgments about the Constitution. Morris would have the Su-
preme Court restore the dispossessed justices to their offices, even though
during the extensive debates over the Repeal Act, the congressional major-
ity made clear that they believed Congress could consistently with Article
III remove federal justices from office by abolishing their offices. 45 Courts
would show deference to Congress solely by presuming, text and history to
the contrary, that the national legislature "did not mean to abolish the of-
fices which the Constitution had forbidden [Congress] to abolish." The
presumption that Congress never passes an unconstitutional measure, in
short, was strictly a canon of statutory interpretation and not a precept re-
quiring deference to constitutional judgments made by elected officials.
The cases discussed below that employed variations on Gouverneur
Morris's fiction display a far more aggressive understanding of federal
judicial power than that championed by Alexander Bickel when he called
for judicial reliance on "passive virtues. '46 Justices committed to a modest
role, Bickel asserted, made every effort to resolve non-constitutional ques-
tions in ways that prevented a constitutional question from arising. He
would have the Supreme Court follow Justice Lewis Brandeis's famous
45. See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 25-30 (1802) (statement of Sen. Breckenridge).
46. See BICKEL, supra note 38, at 111-98.
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suggestion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority and interpret fed-
eral statutes, whenever legally plausible, in ways that left the law free from
constitutional doubt. This practice, Brandeis and Bickel believed, promoted
judicial restraint by enabling Justices to refrain from "passing upon a large
part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon [them] for decision. ''47
Antebellum Justices, by comparison, enthusiastically adjudicated the con-
stitutional questions Brandeis and Bickel sought to avoid. Marshall and
Taney Court opinions consistently began by discussing the constitutional
questions raised by the litigants. The Justices then resolved the remaining
non-constitutional issues in light of their constitutional holding. Justice
John Catron in People's Ferry Company of Boston v. Beers, for example,
first ruled that federal courts had no constitutional power to exercise admi-
ralty jurisdiction in disputes over the wages due to a shipbuilder. After
determining that the Constitution did not permit the Supreme Court to ad-
judicate such appeals, he then concluded that the federal law in question
must not have been intended to vest the Supreme Court with the forbidden
jurisdiction.48 Unlike Bickel and Brandeis who interpreted statutes in ways
that enabled Justices to avoid potential constitutional questions, Catron and
his peers typically interpreted the Constitution in ways that settled potential
statutory questions.
II. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS'S FICTION IN PRACTICE
The Lord Chancellor in Gilbert and Sullivan's lolanthe would have
felt at home on the Ellsworth, Marshall, and Taney Courts. Just as he en-
sured a happy ending consistent with the fairy law by interpreting the pro-
vision in the fairy code declaring "any fairy who marries a mortal shall
incur death" as meaning, in fact, "any fairy who don't marry a mortal shall
incur death," so antebellum federal Justices found equally clever ways to
avoid declaring federal laws unconstitutional when limiting federal power.
The Supreme Court, in approximately twenty cases decided between 1791
and 1860, employed some version of Gouverneur Morris's fiction. Some
opinions rejected the plain meaning of federal statutes in order to avoid
declaring laws unconstitutional. Others held that the federal government
could not exercise a particular power, ignoring federal statutes purporting
to exercise that power. Several decisions sustained state court decisions that
47. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); accord
BICKEL, supra note 38, at 180-82.
48. See 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393, 402 (1858). For a similar use of constitutional analysis to deter-




declared federal laws unconstitutional, without noting the ground for the
state court decision. All the decisions discussed below ruled that the federal
government lacked constitutional power. All that was missing was an ex-
plicit judicial assertion, found in Dred Scott and Marbury, that a particular
federal law was unconstitutional.
A. Statutory Miscontruction
The Supreme Court in many cases decided before the Civil War inter-
preted federal statutes inconsistently with their obvious meaning in order to
establish constitutional limits on federal power without having to declare a
federal law unconstitutional. The Justices in Kentucky v. Dennison con-
strued the statutory declaration in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 that "it
shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state.., to cause the flgi-
tive to be delivered" whenever "the executive authority of [another]
state... shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice, '49 as stating
only a moral responsibility. Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court
acknowledged that "[t]he words 'it shall be the duty,' in ordinary legisla-
tion, imply the assertion of the power to command and coerce obedience."
He rejected that interpretation because the statute so understood was un-
constitutional. "[T]he Federal Government, under the Constitution," Taney
wrote, "has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty what-
ever, and compel him to perform it .... -"50 Consistent with Gouverneur
Morris's fiction, provisions in the federal code that explicitly imposed a
"duty" on a state official were not interpreted as imposing a legal duty that
Congress was forbidden to impose on those state officials.
The Marshall and Ellsworth Courts similarly twisted statutory lan-
guage when interpreting the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 11 of that
measure vested federal circuit courts with jurisdiction over "all suits of a
civil nature at common law ... where... an alien is a party .... '"51 Read
literally, the provision plainly authorized federal courts to adjudicate cases
when both the plaintiff and defendant were not American citizens. So in-
terpreted, Section 11 was inconsistent with Article III of the Constitution.
Mossman v. Higginson observed, "[t]he legislative power of conferring
jurisdiction on the federal Courts, is. .. confined to suits between citizens
49. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302, 302 (emphasis added).
50. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1861). For other Taney Court decisions
employing statutory misconstruction as a means for imposing constitutional limits on federal power
without declaring federal laws unconstitutional, see Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 92
(1858); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 575 (1853); Lytle v. Arkansas, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 314,
334 (1850); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
51. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § I1, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
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and foreigners. .. ." Rather than declare Section 11 unconstitutional, the
Justices interpreted that provision as vesting federal jurisdiction only when
the suit was between a citizen and an alien. "We must so expound the terms
of the law," the unsigned opinion of the Court stated, "as to meet the case."
Statutes, the Justices asserted, "must receive a construction, consistent with
the constitution." 52
The Taney and Marshall Courts avoided declaring unconstitutional
numerous congressional land grants by adopting the presumption that
"[t]he State never intended to grant the lands of another. '53 "[W]hensoever
a tract of land shall have once been legally appropriated to any purpose,"
Justice Phillip Barbour asserted in 1839, "no subsequent law, or proclama-
tion, or sale, would be construed to embrace it, or to operate upon it; al-
though no reservation were made of it."54 No matter what the text of the
private grant, antebellum Justices employing Gouveuneur Morris's fiction
interpreted laws granting federal lands as granting only whatever property
interest the federal government enjoyed when the grant was made. In the
frequent cases in which Congress had previously granted the land in ques-
tion, the national legislature was deemed to have granted nothing by the
subsequent deed. That the actual tract of land was meticulously detailed in
the private law was of no legal significance. Needless to say, no statute
could be declared unconstitutional under this approach to statutory interpre-
tation. One reason why the Chase Court "declared" more federal laws un-
constitutional than the Taney or Marshall Courts was that the Justices after
the Civil War abandoned this presumption. In Reichart v. Felps,55 Justice
Robert Grier first interpreted a federal statute as granting to one settler land
that was previously granted to another settler, and then declared the second
land grant unconstitutional. 56
B. Statutory Neglect
Antebellum Supreme Court Justices frequently avoided declaring fed-
eral laws unconstitutional by resolving constitutional issues before statu-
52. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) (emphasis omitted); accord Jackson v. Twentyman, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 136 (1829); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809). For a similar Marshall
Court exercise in statutory misconstruction, see Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344
(1809); see also Dennis J. Mahoney, A Historical Note on Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 49 UNIV. CHI. L.
REV. 725 (1982) (discussing the influence of statutory misconstruction on Marshall Court decision
making in constitutional cases).
53. Doe ex dem. Govemeur's Heirs v. Robertson, 24 U.S. (I 1 Wheat.) 332, 359 (1826).
54. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (8 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839); see also United States v. Arredondo, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832); Rutherford v. Greene's Heirs, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 196, 203 (1817).
55. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160 (1868).
56. See id. at 165-66.
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tory issues. Opinions first discussed whether the federal government was
constitutionally authorized to engage in the contested action. After the Jus-
tices concluded that federal officials lacked constitutional authority to take
some action, they did not bother determining whether Congress had, in
fact, authorized the forbidden behavior. Such statutory analysis was unnec-
essary, given that the national government could not exercise the power in
question even if warranted by federal statute. By dispensing with any inde-
pendent statutory analysis, Justices employing this version of Gouverneur
Morris's fiction could easily impose constitutional limits on federal power
without striking down federal laws.
Benner v. Porter57 provides a good illustration of this technique. The
Justices in that case held that when passing laws establishing federal juris-
diction over new states, Congress could not authorize former territorial
courts and judges to continue functioning. Federal jurisdiction in new
states, the Justices agreed, could be exercised only by newly established
federal tribunals that met all Article III standards. Any action taken after
statehood by an Article I territorial court or judge was a nullity, even when
that action was authorized by federal law. Justice Samuel Nelson asserted
that
Congress must not only ordain and establish inferior federal courts
within a State, and prescribe their jurisdiction, but the judges appointed
to administer them must possess the constitutional tenure of office before
they can become invested with any portion of the judicial power of the
Union. There is no exception to this rule in the Constitution. The Territo-
rial courts, therefore, were not courts in which the judicial power con-
ferred by the Constitution on the Federal government could be deposited.
They were incapable of receiving it, as the tenure of the incumbents was
but for four years. Neither were they organized by Congress under the
Constitution, as they were invested with powers and jurisdiction which
that body were incapable of conferring upon a court within the limits of a
State. 58
This passage plainly circumscribes federal power over federal
jurisdiction. Congress, Benner explicitly ruled, may not constitutionally
vest an Article I court with Article III powers. Any decision made by a
territorial judge after statehood is utterly void. The Benner opinion does
not, however, indicate whether Congress actually authorized a territorial
court to exercise federal judicial power in a state. Losing counsel pointed to
several statutes that appeared to vest territorial courts with some powers
until Article III courts were established.59 Justice Nelson never spoke of
these statutes. Having concluded that territorial courts could not
57. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235 (1850).
58. Id. at 244 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 239 (argument of appellee) (referring to Act of Feb. 22, 1847, ch. 17, 9 Stat. 128).
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utes. Having concluded that territorial courts could not constitutionally
adjudicate cases once a territory became a state, he refrained from explor-
ing whether Congress had attempted to vest former territorial courts with
that jurisdiction.
The Justices similarly ignored federal statutes when settling disputes
over the ownership of land acquired by the Louisiana Purchase and Mexi-
can Cession. The Supreme Court in several cases ruled that persons who
held good title to land before that land was ceded to the United States could
not constitutionally be divested of that title. "Such a title," Doe v. Eslava
ruled, "is not to be affected or regulated by the political authorities to
whom a country is afterwards ceded, any more than any private rights and
property of the inhabitants of such a country." 60 This presumption meant
that when faced with a lawsuit between a person who claimed to hold title
to land before the cession and a settler who claimed title by a private grant
from Congress after the cession, the Supreme Court had no need to inter-
pret the grant or any law authorizing a federal agent to grant land. If the
former settler's title was good before the cession, the land belonged to that
settler no matter what the provisions in subsequent federal law. As was the
case in Benner, the Supreme Court, by resolving the constitutional issues
before the statutory issues, was able to impose a constitutional limit on
federal power without determining whether any existing federal law was
unconstitutional. 6'
C. Omitting the Magic Words
The Supreme Court in several cases did everything possible to declare
a federal law unconstitutional but utter the phrase "we find this federal law
unconstitutional." Several of these decisions rejected claims based on fed-
eral laws granting land below the highwater mark of the Mobile River.
When these assertions of federal right were made in state court, the con-
gressional grants were declared "inoperative. '62 Judge Henry Collier of the
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that "it is not competent for Congress to
grant a right of property" in state riverbeds.63 Justice John McKinley in
Pollard v. Hagan64 endorsed that state court holding. His majority opinion
60. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 421, 445 (1850); see also Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838).
61. For other instances of statutory neglect as a means of imposing constitutional limits on federal
power without declaring federal laws unconstitutional, see Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (I Wall.)
243, 251 (1864); Willot v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 79, 82 (1857); DeLauriere v. Emison, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 525, 538 (1854); Chouteau v. Eckhart, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 344 (1844).
62. City of Mobile v. Eslava, 9 Port. 577, 604 (Ala. 1839).
63. Id. at 603.
64. 44 U.S. (3 How.)212 (1845).
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asserted, "This right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under
the navigable waters ... belongs exclusively to the states ... and they, and
they only, have the constitutional power to exercise it.' '65 Interpreting fed-
eral powers under Article IV narrowly, McKinley further declared, "The
right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to
make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof,
conferred no power to grant the plaintiffs the land in controversy .... "66
The last sentence of his opinion stated, "The judgment of the Supreme
Court of the state of Alabama is, therefore, affirmed."'67 What McKinley
did not note is that the Alabama Supreme Court had explicitly declared
federal laws void. This omission did not go unnoticed. Justice Catron's
dissent in Pollard bluntly asserted, "This act is declared void in the present
cause .... "68
The Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the principles of Pollard
in two subsequent cases. Doe v. Beebe69 summarily declared that the fed-
eral government had no power to grant lands below the highwater mark of
a river. The reporter's headnote to the case asserted that the Justices had
determined that "after the admission of Alabama into the Union as a State,
Congress could make no grant of land situated between high and low water
marks."'70 Neither the reporter nor the Court bothered to declare void the
actual congressional grant of such land. The Justices in Goodtitle v. Kibbe71
ruled that while the federal government could grant land below the highwa-
ter mark of a river when governing territories, states had to honor past fed-
eral grants only when the title had been perfected before statehood. The
existence of an imperfect title, Chief Justice Taney stated, "could not
enlarge the power of the United States over the place in question ... nor
authorize the general government to grant or confirm a title to land when
the sovereignty and dominion over it had become vested in the State."'72
Again, while the Justices rejected a claim of federal constitutional author-
ity, they refrained from noting that federal statutes passed on the basis of
that claimed authority were unconstitutional.
65. Id. at 230.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 233 (Catron, J., dissenting).
69. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 25 (1852).
70. Id. at 25.
71. 50 U.S. (9 How.)471 (1850).
72. Id. at 478.
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New Orleans v. United States73 further limited federal power to grant
land by holding that the national government could not constitutionally
grant title to property within a state, even when the disputed tract had been
dedicated for public purposes while the state was a territory. Congress,
after Louisiana joined the Union, passed at least three statutes exercising
control over the particular parcels of land in dispute.74 Justice John
McLean's opinion for the Court recognized that Congress had asserted
national authority over these tracts. 75 He nevertheless insisted that such
control was inconsistent with the constitutional allocation of authority over
property. In his view, the federal government could exercise exclusive ju-
risdiction only over land being used for the narrow purposes set out in Arti-
cle I, Section 8. "Special provision is made in the constitution, for the
cession of jurisdiction from the states over places where the federal gov-
ernment shall establish forts, or other military works," McLean wrote,
"[a]nd it is only in these places, or in the territories of the United States,
where it can exercise a general jurisdiction. '76 As the federal government
did not use the contested land for "military works" when Louisiana was a
territory, the land reverted to state control upon statehood. Having estab-
lished the constitutional justification for state ownership of the contested
land, McLean concluded that the local law authorizing sale of the land was
constitutional. 77 In keeping with the rhetorical conventions of the time, his
opinion did not assert that the local law was constitutional only because the
conflicting federal laws were unconstitutional.
D. McNulty v. Batty
McNulty v. Batty78 warrants special mention as an extraordinarily
creative judicial effort to articulate constitutional limits on federal power
without explicitly declaring a federal law unconstitutional. The issue before
the Justices in that case was whether the Supreme Court could hear an ap-
peal on a writ of error from a territorial court after the territory became a
state. Following Benner and Hunt v. Palao,79 the Justices first ruled that
territorial courts could not constitutionally exercise any judicial authority
73. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
74. See Act of Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 16, 3 Stat. 661; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 115, 3 Stat. 465; Act of
Apr. 3, 1812, ch. 48, 2 Stat. 700.
75. See New Orleans, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 734-35.
76. Id. at 737.
77. See id.
78. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 72 (1851).
79. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 589, 590 (1846).
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after statehood.80 Unlike those two cases, Justice Samuel Nelson's majority
opinion in McNulty explicitly acknowledged that the national legislature
had authorized appeals from territorial decisions to the federal judiciary.
Congress in 1848 passed a statute vesting the Supreme Court with jurisdic-
tion over "all cases which may be pending in the Supreme or other Superior
Court of and for any Territory of the United States ... at the time of such
admission, and not previously removed by a writ of error .... ,,81 The los-
ing party in McNulty, however, obtained a writ of error to the Supreme
Court before Wisconsin became a state. As such, that appeal was not within
the terms of 1848 Judiciary Act, having been "previously removed." Justice
Nelson recognized Congress, by the phrase "not previously removed by a
writ of error," did not mean that federal courts should be vested with juris-
diction over appeals from territorial courts made after statehood but not
before. The statutory language, he acknowledged, "was drawn, doubtless,
under the supposition, that ... no legislation was necessary to preserve or
give effect to the jurisdiction of the court" when the writ of error had been
granted before statehood.8 2 Nevertheless, Nelson concluded, this federal
legislative "opinion" was "founded in [constitutional] error. '83 Article III
mandated that Congress pass new legislation vesting federal courts with
jurisdiction over appeals from territorial courts after statehood, even when
the appeal was taken while the state was still a territory. The legislative
mistake, however, was one of omission. Congress had not passed an un-
constitutional act. Rather, the national legislature, misinterpreting Article
III, had failed to pass the necessary statute. The only consequence of the
legislative failing was that the Supreme Court ruled that no jurisdiction
existed to adjudicate appeals Congress thought the Justices were authorized
by statute to adjudicate.
Justice Nelson then announced that had Congress understood the
proper constitutional procedure for vesting courts with jurisdiction over
appeals from defunct territorial courts, the resulting statute would have
been unconstitutional. McNulty could not be adjudicated by an Article III
court even if Congress passed a statute properly vesting jurisdiction, he
insisted, because the case neither raised an issue of federal law nor met the
constitutional standards for federal diversity jurisdiction. "Should the
judgment be affirmed or reversed," Nelson concluded, federal courts "pos-
sessed no power to carry the mandate into execution, the case not being one
80. McNulty, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 78-79.
81. Id. at 79 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Act of Feb. 22, 1848, ch. 12, § 2, 9 Stat. 211).
82. Id. at 80.
83. Id.
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of Federal jurisdiction .... ,,84 Nelson could omit the magic words "this
law is unconstitutional," because Congress, not understanding the constitu-
tional requirements for providing for appeals from defunct territorial courts
to federal courts, made a constitutional mistake by failing to pass an appro-
priately drafted federal statute. Had the federal statute been drafted cor-
rectly, the measure would have been declared unconstitutional.
E. Imposing Constitutional Limits on State Power
The structure of antebellum judicial opinions imposing constitutional
limits on state power was different than the structure of antebellum judicial
opinions imposing constitutional limits on federal power. Opinions impos-
ing constitutional limits on federal power often began by discussing consti-
tutional issues and then either did not bother with statutory interpretation or
interpreted the federal law in light of constitutional standards. Opinions
imposing constitutional limits on state power consistently began with the
statutory question. Textualism was the dominant form of statutory interpre-
tation when state laws were before the Court. "[W]here the words of a law,
treaty, or contract, have a plain and obvious meaning," Justice Johnson
declared, "all construction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded. ''85
Constitutional questions were resolved only after the Justices determined
the plain meaning of the statute. This ordering of legal issues and commit-
ment to textualism only when interpreting state statutes helps explain why
the Justices made extensive use of Gouverneur Morris's fiction when im-
posing constitutional limits on federal power, while consistently asserting
that state laws were unconstitutional when imposing constitutional limits
on state power.
Supreme Court Justices do not ever seem to have employed Gou-
verneur Morris's fiction when imposing constitutional limits on state
power. From the very beginning, judicial opinions typically contained blunt
assertions that state statutes were unconstitutional. "[I]n this case," Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck concluded,
the state of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which
are common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the
constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate
of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and
legally impaired .. .86
84. Id. at 79-80.
85. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 89-90 (1823).
86. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810); accord Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 438 (1830)
(stating "which act is, in the opinion of this court, repugnant to the constitution of the United States");
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 868 (1824) (stating "the act of the State of
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Many Marshall Court opinions imposing constitutional limits on state
power began with a sentence asserting that the central issue in the case was
whether a state law was constitutional and ended with a sentence declaring
the state law unconstitutional. Marshall in Dartmouth College v. Woodward
opened by stating, "The single question now to be considered is, do the acts
to which the verdict refers violate the constitution of the United States." He
concluded with the proposition that "the acts of the legislature of New
Hampshire, which are stated in the special verdict found in this cause, are
repugnant to the constitution .... -"87 The few Marshall Court cases impos-
ing constitutional limits on states that did not contain the declaration "the
state statute is unconstitutional" nevertheless explicitly struck down the
state law in question. In United States v. Peters the Justices first noted that
the state "act in question" supported state "interposition in this particular
case." After several pages of legal analysis, they determined that "the state
of Pennsylvania can possess no constitutional right to resist the legal proc-
ess which may be directed in this cause."'88
Taney Court opinions similarly declared laws unconstitutional when-
ever the Justices imposed constitutional limits on state government. Many
Justices continued the Marshall Court practice of announcing the issue to
be the constitutionality of a state law and concluding with a declaration that
the state law was unconstitutional. Justice Joseph Story in Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania first observed that "[t]he question arising in the case, as to the
constitutionality of the statute of Pennsylvania, has been most elaborately
argued at the bar." He finished by proclaiming, "[W]e are of opinion that
the act of Pennsylvania upon which the indictment is founded, is unconsti-
tutional .... -89 Several opinions imposing constitutional limits on state
Ohio... is repugnant to a law of the United States, made in pursuance of the constitution, and, there-
fore, void"); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 208 (1819) (stating "the act of the State
of New-York... is contrary to the constitution of the United States"); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (stating "[w]e are unanimously of opinion, that the law passed by the legis-
lature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, is unconstitutional and void");
New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 167 (1812) (stating "[t]his contract is certainly impaired
by a law which would annul this essential part of it").
87. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 625, 654 (1819). For other opinions similarly structured, see Worces-
ter v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 536, 562 (1832); Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 449, 463-64, 469 (1829); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 436, 449(1827); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 186, 221 (1824); Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 10, 17.
88. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136, 141 (1809); accord Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52
(1815) (concluding that state "statutes. . . are not.., operative" after asserting that a legislative "repeal
[ofl statutes creating private corporations" is inconsistent with "the spirit and the letter of the constitu-
tion of the United States").
89. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 609-10, 625 (1842); accord Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
304, 307, 320-21 (1854); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 393, 408-09 (1849); Planters' Bank
v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 318, 334 (1848); Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133,
144, 149 (1845); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (I How.) 311, 314, 320 (1843); Dobbins v. Comm'rs of
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power either announced the issue was whether a state law was constitu-
tional or concluded the state law in question was unconstitutional. In
Woodruff v. Trapnall and Dodge v. Woolsey, the Justices stated that the
issue in the case was whether a particular state law was unconstitutional,
interpreted the state law as impairing an obligation of an existing contract,
and then stated that such laws, in general, were unconstitutional.90 Justice
Henry Baldwin in McCracken v. Hayward ended his opinion with the
statement that the "legislation" in question was "repugnant to the Constitu-
tion of the United States."9 1 The Taney Court in Trustees for Vincennes
University v. Indiana and Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co. first inter-
preted state laws as imposing certain obligations on the defendants and
then, without explicitly stating the specific state laws were unconstitutional,
ruled that states could not constitutionally impose those obligations. 92
III. RETHINKING ANTEBELLUM JUDICIAL PRACTICE
A. Submerged Judicial Activism
The cases in which Supreme Court Justices employed some version of
Gouverneur Morris's fiction reveal a different constitutional universe from
that depicted by standard works on judicial review and American constitu-
tional development. Dred Scott is thought to be a dramatic judicial break
from past practice, because the Justices had not explicitly declared a federal
law unconstitutional for more than fifty years.93 The Taney Court's asser-
tion that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional was, however,
quite consistent with antebellum judicial practice in cases raising questions
about constitutional limits on federal power. The Justices asserted that Con-
gress could not vest Article I courts with Article III powers,94 they forbade
Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435, 444, 450 (1842); see also Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
461, 464-65 (1861); Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169, 172, 175 (1861); Sinnot v. Davenport,
63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 239, 244 (1860); Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 162, 169 (1845)
(adopting the same structure for an opinion declaring a state law inconsistent with a compact between
the United States and a state).
90. See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 339, 360 (1856); Woodruff v. Trapnall, 51
U.S. (10 How.) 190, 204, 207 (1851).
91. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608, 615 (1844); see also Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 392 (1854) ("[T]he tax law of 1851 ... impairs the obligation of contract,
which is prohibited by the Constitution of the United States ....").
92. See Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596, 599-600 (1855); Trs. for
Vincennes Univ. v. Indiana, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 268, 277 (1853).
93. See supra note 23 and the relevant text.
94. See supra notes 57-58 and the relevant text.
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forbade federal officials from imposing duties on state officers, 95 they de-
nied federal authority over riverbeds and property previously dedicated to
public use after a territory became a state, 96 and they insisted that the fed-
eral government honor land titles legally acquired before a territory became
part of the United States. 97 The novelty of Dred Scott lay in the language
the Justices used when imposing a constitutional limit on federal power,
not in the judicial willingness to limit federal power.
The antebellum cases declaring constitutional limits on federal power
cast doubt on common assertions that the judicial decision declaring the
Missouri Compromise unconstitutional broke with a past tradition of judi-
cial deference to national elected officials. The scholars who have cele-
brated this claimed practice insist that federal Justices, until Dred Scott,
would declare unconstitutional only federal laws of a judicial nature98 or
federal laws that no reasonable person would think constitutional.99 Dean
Larry Kramer maintains that most antebellum Justices previous to Dred
Scott understood their decisions as binding only the parties to the case. 100
Taney Court practice from 1835 until 1857 did not exhibit these tendencies.
Judicial majorities often imposed limits on federal power in cases that were
not of a judicial nature. Pollard v. Hagan and subsequent decisions re-
solved controversies over land titles, not disputes over federal jurisdiction
or internal judicial processes. Judicial majorities before the Civil War were
willing to prohibit federal actions that a reasonable person might think
constitutional. Congressional majorities for more than two hundred years
have imposed some legal duties on local officials, 10 1 and many distin-
guished constitutional thinkers have thought such measures constitu-
tional. 102 When imposing these constitutional limits on federal power, the
Justices announced broad principles of constitutional law that they believed
95. See supra note 50 and the relevant text.
96. See supra note 73 and the relevant text.
97. See supra note 60 and the relevant text.
98. See ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 117-21
(1989); MATTHEW J. FRANCK, AGAINST THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE 67-68 (1996).
99. See SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 34-38 (1990);
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
TERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 1-116 (1986).
100. KRAMER, supra note 22, at 93-207.
101. See, e.g., Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993) (requiring state officials to conduct background checks on persons purchasing handguns); Act of
June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 666 (requiring state officials to keep naturalization records); Act of Mar.
26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (requiring state officials to administer oaths of office).
102. See especially Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 228-30 (1987) (overruling Kentucky v.
Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861)); THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 239 (Alexander Hamilton), No.
45, at 295 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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bound all government actors, not just the parties to the lawsuit before the
Court. Indeed, the judicial practice of announcing general limitations on
federal power probably better expresses the view that the Court was provid-
ing guidelines that all officials had to follow rather than a mere declaration
that a particular law is unconstitutional, which might more plausibly be
limited to the circumstances of a particular case.
This consistent judicial willingness to impose constitutional limits on
federal power helps explain what would otherwise be an anomalous feature
of the constitutional politics responsible for the Dred Scott decision. As is
well known, most Southerners by the 1850s enthusiastically supported
legislation promoting the Supreme Court as the institution responsible for
determining the constitutional status of slavery in the territories. 103 "[W]e
are entitled to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States," Jef-
ferson Davis stated in 1850, as to whether the South "may have that equal
participation in the enjoyment of the Territories."'104 Other prominent Jack-
sonians made similar declarations. 105 Southerners would not likely have
placed so much trust in a federal judiciary if they believed the Justices had
not imposed a constitutional limit on federal power for over fifty years.
Jacksonians who thought federal courts were committed to striking down
only laws no reasonable persons thought constitutional would probably
have insisted on more specific legislative sanctions for the right to bring
slaves into the territories. Slaveholding representatives were aware that a
Southern majority sat on the Taney Court and they may have had inside
information. Antebellum Justices often leaked their constitutional senti-
ments. 106 Still, their confidence in a favorable judicial resolution was
probably partly rooted in the common understanding that the Justices, in
previous cases, had frequently declared constitutional limits on federal
power in cases that were not of a judicial nature and where a reasonable
person might think the federal action constitutional. Past practice gave
Southerners little reason to expect a judicial opinion asserting that "the
Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional." Nevertheless, given the narrow
understanding of federal power to govern territory within a state announced
in New Orleans v. United States107 and the strict constitutional limits im-
103. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS 200-01, 204, 207-08 (1978); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legisla-
tive Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 46-50 (1993); Wallace Mendelson, Dred
Scott's Case-Reconsidered, 38 MINN. L. REV. 16, 22-23 (1953).
104. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. 154 (1850).
105. See generally GRABER, supra note 22, at 34 (citing numerous sources).
106. Auchampaugh, supra note 37, at 234-38.
107. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 737 (1836).
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
posed on federal power in other antebellum decisions, 108 Southerners, at
the very least, had reason for expecting a judicial opinion asserting "Con-
gress has no power to ban slavery in the territories," even if that opinion
did not find as a matter of statutory interpretation that Congress had, in
fact, banned slavery in the territories.
B. Dred Scott Revisited
The rhetorical choices open to antebellum Justices exercising the
power of judicial review suggest that Marshall in Marbury and Taney in
Dred Scott were not merely announcing constitutional limits on federal
power when they explicitly asserted that federal laws were unconstitu-
tional. Gouvereur Morris's fiction, employed on every other occasion be-
fore the Civil War when Justices imposed constitutional limits on federal
power, could easily have been employed in Marbury and Dred Scott. Mar-
shall in Marbury might have first determined that the Constitution did not
vest the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over William Marbury's
claim and then either ignored the statutory question or insisted that Section
13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 be interpreted consistently with the Court's
constitutional conclusions. The latter strategy would not have required an
implausible interpretation of federal law. 109 Significantly, the Justices in
1800 and 1809 championed far more implausible interpretations of federal
law in order to avoid exercising jurisdiction in circumstances they believed
would be unconstitutional."10 This judicial willingness to employ Gou-
verneur Morris's fiction when the political stakes were lower supports
speculation that the Marbury opinion was structured in ways that would
enable Marshall to conclude with an essay defending the judicial power to
declare federal laws unconstitutional. I "'
Had Taney and his brethren wished to communicate only what the
Justices had communicated in previous cases imposing constitutional limi-
tations on the federal government, they similarly could have refrained from
asserting that Congress had exceeded its constitutional powers. Following
judicial practice in cases limiting federal power to make land grants, 112 the
108. See especially Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 106-07 (1861); Pollard v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229-40 (1845).
109. For evidence that Marshall in Marbury was quite willing to manipulate both Section 13 of the
Judiciary Act and Article III of the Constitution, see William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1, 14-16, 30-33.
110. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809); Mossman v. Higginson, 4
U.S. (4 Dal].) 12, 14 (1800).
111. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 25, at 25-28.
112. See supra notes 54, 60, 64-77 and the relevant text.
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Justices in the Dred Scott majority might have interpreted the Missouri
Compromise as banning slavery only in those territories where Congress
was constitutionally authorized to ban slavery. Following judicial practice
in cases on the status of territorial courts after statehood, 113 the majority
and concurring opinions might have concluded that slaveholders had a right
to bring slaves into the territories without discussing whether any contrary
federal law existed. Taney might have ruled that Congress, by passing the
Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Compromise of 1850, had repealed the Mis-
souri Compromise and given that repeal retroactive effect. 114 After so in-
terpreting federal statutory law of 1857, Taney might then have held that
determining whether slavery was statutorily banned in territories before
1850 was unnecessary because the Ex Post Facto Clause did not forbid the
national government legislature from retroactively applying civil laws.
115
Such opinions might seem strange to contemporary ears, but they were far
more consistent with antebellum practice than the opinions actually written
in Dred Scott.
Constitutional law does not explain why the Justices in Dred Scott
abandoned the fiction employed in previous cases that the imposition of
constitutional limits on federal power did not pit national elected officials
against federal Justices. The constitutional questions Dred Scott resolved
were quite similar to those resolved by New Orleans.116 The Justices in
Dred Scott narrowly interpreted federal power to govern territories outside
the jurisdiction of existing states. The Justices in New Orleans narrowly
interpreted federal power to govern territory within the jurisdiction of an
existing state. Neither case raised questions of a judicial nature, both as-
serted very broad restrictions on federal power, and reasonable persons
might dispute whether either restriction was correct. Judged by strictly
legal standards, New Orleans was as activist a judicial decision as Dred
Scott. 117 Nevertheless, the majority opinion in New Orleans minimized the
appearance of conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court, while the
Justices in Dred Scott bluntly asserted that they were challenging existing
legislative constitutional understandings.
Constitutional politics better explain why no member of the Dred
Scott majority employed some version of Gouverneur Morris's fiction
113. See supra notes 57-59, 78-84 and the relevant text.
114. For similar claims by Southern representatives, see HOLT, supra note 35, at 806-21.
115. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91 (1798).
116. See supra notes 73-77 and the relevant text.
117. The Justices in Kentucky v. Dennison similarly imposed a sharp limit on federal power in a
case that was not of a judiciary nature and in which reasonable persons might think federal power
existed. See supra notes 49-50 and the relevant text.
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when imposing constitutional limits on federal power to ban slavery in the
territories. The central element of Morris's fiction was the pretense that
national elected officials and federal Justices agreed on the relevant consti-
tutional rules and standards. This illusion could be easily maintained in
such cases as Pollard and New Orleans, which raised constitutional issues
that were relatively inconsequential politically. No social or partisan
movement of any prominence cared which of the two claimants was the
rightful owner of a small tract of land. The precise intricacies of federal
jurisdiction during the transition from territory to state at stake in Benner v.
Porter was no more consequential politically. The Justices frequently em-
ployed Gouverneur Morris's fiction after Congress, because of poor record
keeping, accidentally granted the same land twice. Judicial opinions cor-
recting these errors and similar legislative "mistakes" could plausibly pre-
tend that Congress had not intended to violate the Constitution as the
Constitution was interpreted by the Supreme Court. The fiction was simply
that the Court was acting consistently with preexisting legislative constitu-
tional understandings rather than, as was actually the case, laying down
constitutional rules that national legislators would not find objectionable.
Sustaining this portrayal of harmony between the Justices and elected
officials was far more difficult in Dred Scott. The Missouri Compromise
could hardly be described as a legislative oversight. The Taney Court could
not as easily ignore the Missouri Compromise or insist that the 1820
agreement did not actually prohibit human bondage in the Northwest. Anti-
slavery advocates were loudly proclaiming that the Missouri Compromise
existed, federal law banned slavery in certain territories, and the federal
government had the constitutional power to ban slavery in those territories.
The Taney Court, for these reasons, could not plausibly disregard the Mis-
souri Compromise or insist that, public consensus to the contrary, the 1820
agreement did not prohibit human bondage in the Northwest. By declaring
the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, the Justices were acknowledg-
ing the intense political debate over the constitutionality of slavery in the
territories and communicating their constitutional disagreement with those
elected officials who insisted that bans on slavery were constitutional.
Antebellum Justices tended to declare laws unconstitutional when im-
posing limitations on federal or state power only when federal judicial au-
thority was challenged. Marshall's declaration in Marbury that a federal
law was unconstitutional was a response to the numerous Jeffersonians
who denounced judicial power during the debate over the Repeal Act of
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1802.118 The Justices may not have explicitly declared a federal law uncon-
stitutional between Marbury and Dred Scott, because they recognized that
national legislatures accepted the judicial prerogative to determine land
ownership and technical issues of federal jurisdiction. As Chief Justice
Marshall declared without contradiction in Soulard v. United States, "[T]he
duty of deciding on these various titles" had been "transferred by the gov-
ernment to the judicial department.... " 119 The resulting judicial aware-
ness that decisions imposing constitutional limits on federal power settled
the constitutional issue as a practical matter mitigated against language
asserting that the judicial decision also settled the constitutional issue as a
theoretical matter. There being no explicit need to announce "a dangerous
and hateful clashing of public authorities," no announcement was forth-
coming.
The constitutional politics of Dred Scott more resembled the constitu-
tional politics underlying decisions announcing limitations on state power
in which the Justices consistently declared laws unconstitutional. Local
officials in antebellum America frequently ignored federal judicial rul-
ings; 120 prominent politicians asserted that states were constitutionally
authorized to determine the constitutional limits on state and federal
power;121 and Congress debated whether to repeal Section 25 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, which authorized federal courts to declare state laws un-
constitutional. 122 Judicial opinions that plainly challenged existing state
legislative and judicial judgments by imposing limitations on state power
were means for articulating the Justices' commitment to the supremacy of
federal interpretations of federal constitutional law. Such an expression of
judicial authority was necessary in Dred Scott. Antislavery advocates in
Congress had challenged judicial authority over the status of slavery in the
territories. Salmon Chase, when criticizing legislative proposals foisting
responsibility for resolving sectional issues onto the federal courts, asserted
that the Justices "are not more than other men exempt from the bias of edu-
118. See Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 38
TULSA L. REv. 609, 640-41 (2003).
119. 29U.S.(4Pet.)51l,513(l830).
120. See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, State Resistance to Authority in Federal Unions: The Early
United States (1790-1860) and the European Community (1958-94), 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 149
(1997).
121. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 286 (Merrill D. Peterson
ed., 1975).
122. See Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States: A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REv. 161, 164, 176-85
(1913).
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cation, sympathy, and interest." 123 The Supreme Court in Dred Scott, by
declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, was communicating
the same judicial authority to settle controversies over the constitutional
limits on federal power as the Justices had previously exercised in contro-
versies over the constitutional limits on state power.
The explicit language declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitu-
tional probably also expressed contempt for antislavery advocates. Gou-
verneur Morris's fiction was partly a canon of judicial protocol.
"Decency," he believed, normally counseled against "presum[ing] to be-
lieve, much less to declare" that elected officials "meant to violate the Con-
stitution." National representatives who accidentally granted the same land
twice or who were not familiar with the principles for vesting federal juris-
diction when a territory became a state remained worthy of constitutional
respect. Opinions such as Benner and New Orleans communicated to the
cognoscenti that the Whigs and Democrats who held nationally elected
offices were as committed to constitutional norms as the Justices, only
slightly less informed about the appropriate constitutional norms. Given the
expected legislative willingness to abide by judicial standards, a judicial
declaration that Congress had made a constitutional mistake would be bad
legal manners, picking an unnecessary fight over constitutional authority
with a complaisant legislature. From the perspective of the Taney Court,
however, the Republican Party was engaged in a conspiracy against the
Constitution. Politicians who insisted that bans on slavery in the territories
were constitutional were acting in bad faith. Lincoln and others needed to
be exposed as potential usurpers, not gently corrected. The linguistic prac-
tice that in 1857 best communicated this hostility to the antislavery move-
ment was an explicit declaration that the Missouri Compromise was
unconstitutional.
IV. ROGER TANEY'S FICTION
Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott substituted one legal fiction for an-
other. Gouverneur Morris's fiction diminished the appearance of actual
conflict between the Justices and elected officials. Congress must have
thought the federal government retained an interest in land dedicated to
public purposes while a state was a territory; otherwise national legislators
would not have passed three statutes asserting sovereignty over those tracts.
Nevertheless, the opinion in New Orleans, by not explicitly declaring fed-
123. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. 474 (1850); see also CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 610 (1849) (speech of Horace Greeley).
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eral laws inconsistent with its holding unconstitutional, fostered percep-
tions that the Justices and national officials agreed on the relevant constitu-
tional principles. Roger Taney's fiction, by comparison, inflated the
appearance of actual conflict between the Justices and elected officials. As
numerous scholars have pointed out, crucial features of the Missouri Com-
promise were legislatively repealed in 1854 (if not in 1850). Congressional
majorities invited the Supreme Court to determine whether the Missouri
Compromise was unconstitutional, and the Justices, before making the
decision, were well aware that the holding would receive the support of the
President of the United States. 124 The majority opinions in Dred Scott, by
declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, fostered perceptions
that the Justices were challenging congressional understandings of the ap-
propriate constitutional principles.
The Supreme Court during the quarter century after Dred Scott oscil-
lated between Gouverneur Morris's fiction and Roger Taney's fiction. An
increasing number of decisions announcing limits on federal power de-
clared laws unconstitutional. Others did not. Remarkably, the evidence
suggests that the language the Justices employed bore no relationship to
whether legislative majorities actually intended to enshrine contrary consti-
tutional principles. Taney's opinion in Dennison was almost certainly in-
consistent with the congressional belief in 1793 that the federal government
could impose some duties on elected officials. The Chase Court relied on
such techniques in Collector v. Day and United States v. Railroad Con.-
pany, when the Justices ruled that, for constitutional reasons, a statute
could not be interpreted as regulating behavior that the plain language of
the statute quite clearly regulated. Both decisions held that the federal gov-
ernment could not constitutionally pass certain laws, but that constitutional
barrier was used as a means to justify the decision to (mis)construe the
federal statute in a certain way, rather than as a judicial declaration that the
statute was unconstitutional. The same Justices, however, often declared
laws unconstitutional even when little reason existed for thinking that
elected officials were championing contrary constitutional principles. As
noted above, one reason why the Chase Court "declared" more laws uncon-
stitutional than the Taney Court was that Chase Court majorities tended to
assert that the federal government had acted unconstitutionally when Con-
gress granted the same land twice. 125
124. See supra notes 35, 37.
125. Compare Reichart v. Felps, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160, 165-66 (1868) ("Congress is bound to
regard the public treaties, and it had no power to organize a board of revision to nullify titles confirmed
many years before by the authorized agents of the government"), with Willot v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 79, 82 (1857) (holding that an 1816 confirmation defeated an 1836 confirmation because "where
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Gordon v. United States,126 the third case in which the Supreme Court
is conventionally regarded as declaring a federal law unconstitutional, illus-
trates the transition between routine use of Gouverneur Morris's fiction
before the Civil War and routine use of Roger Taney's fiction afterwards.
The one paragraph majority opinion issued when the case was decided
announced constitutional limitations on federal power without declaring a
federal law unconstitutional. The Justices asserted only that "under the
Constitution, no appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Claims could be
exercised by [the Supreme Court] .... -127 Twenty years later, the Justices
published the draft opinion for Gordon that Chief Justice Taney had written
before his death. That opinion made clear that the Court was declaring an
act of Congress unconstitutional and included a spirited defense of that
judicial power. Remarkably, while the Justices had previously relied on
statutory misconstruction as a means for imposing constitutional limits on
federal power without striking down a federal statute, Gordon was the first
case since Marbury in which the Justices appear to have engaged in statu-
tory misconstruction in order to declare a federal law unconstitutional.
The majority opinion in Gordon v. United States employed a particu-
larly creative version of Roger Taney's fiction. The law under constitu-
tional attack in that case was part of a federal statute designed to ensure
that the Court of Claims would be a court in fact as well as in name. Courts
in the United States enjoy Article III status only if their decisions cannot be
reversed by non-judicial officials. A lengthy debate over whether the Court
of Claims should be a legislative (Article I) or judicial (Article III) body
was apparently resolved when the Senate rejected an amendment to the bill
permitting elected officials to revise the decisions of the bench. Congress
then added, without debate, Section 14, a provision authorizing the Secre-
there are two confirmations for the same land, the elder must hold it"); DeLauriere v. Emison, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 525, 538 (1854) ("The confirmation of the claim by Congress, in 1836, had relation back to
the origin of the title; but it could not impair rights which had accrued, when the land was unprotected
by a reservation from sale; and when, in fact, the right of the claimant was barred."); Chouteau v.
Eckhart, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 344 (1844) (holding that a claim confirmed in 1812 defeated a claim con-
firmed in 1836). See United States v. Covilland, 66 U.S. (I Black) 339, 341 (1862) ("[A] confirmation
in the name of the original grantee, divesting the legal title of the United States, is binding on the gov-
ernment and on the assignees ... "); Landes v. Brant, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 348, 370 (1851) ("[W]hen
Congress confirmed and completed an imperfect claim, and then confirmed another and different claim
for the same land, the older confirmation defeated the younger one .... ); Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 223, 233-34 (1850) ("[W]here the same land has been twice granted, the elder patent may be set
up in a defence by a trespasser, when sued by a claimant under the younger grant .. "); Les Bois v.
Bramell, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 449, 464 (1846) ("[T]here being two adverse claims to the same land.., the
first grantee took the legal and exclusive title."); Stoddard v. Chambers, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 284, 317
(1844) ("[T]he elder legal title must prevail in the action of ejectment ... .
126. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865).
127. Id. at 561.
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tary of the Treasury to pay successful claimants in the Court of Claims.
Oblivious to the debate and language of the bill, the Supreme Court in
Gordon interpreted Section 14 as authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury
not to pay certain claims.' 28 On that ground, the Justices declared unconsti-
tutional the section in the Court of Claims Act that required the Supreme
Court to hear appeals from the Court of Claims rulings. No appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Justices maintained, could lie from a body whose deci-
sions could be upset by an administrative officer. 129 Congress, which never
intended to give the Secretary of the Treasury discretionary power, re-
sponded immediately by removing the offending section. 130 Lyman Trum-
bull, the sponsor of both the original and repeal measure declared, "I do not
think, and I did not think at the time, that the fourteenth section altered the
previous provisions of the act," and that "[t]he construction of the law has
been such as not to carry out the intention of Congress."' 131
Taney's draft Gordon opinion was published at a time when the Su-
preme Court was reasserting control over constitutional meaning. During
the same year in which the Waite Court announced the rediscovery of
Taney's defense of judicial review, the Justices in Mugler v. Kansas, for
the first time in history, cited Marbury as supporting the judicial power to
declare laws unconstitutional. 132 Gouverneur Morris's fiction, after Mugler,
was increasingly abandoned. For Waite and Fuller Court Justices, judicial
review was the judicial power to declare explicitly that federal and state
laws were unconstitutional. That these Courts were in part a product of
congressional decisions in 1875 to 1891 to expand federal jurisdiction as a
means to promote Republican constitutional visions 133 was, as proper use
of Roger Taney's fiction demanded, absent from these discussions of courts
as a check on legislative power.
Taney's legal fiction dominates contemporary constitutional dis-
course. Contemporary constitutionalism remains obsessed by a counter-
majoritarian problem that a generation of political scientists and some law
professors have demonstrated does not describe American constitutional
politics. When the Justices explicitly declare a law unconstitutional, they
typically do so only after being invited by members of the dominant na-
128. Draft opinion of Taney, C.J., in Gordon, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561, published as an appendix at
117 U.S. 697, 698-99 (1886).
129. Id. at 702-03, 706.
130. See Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
131. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 770-71 (1866) (speech of Mr. Trumbull).
132. See 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); CLINTON, supra note 98, at 120.
133. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas:
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 511 (2002).
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tional coalition. Affiliated Presidents typically promote judicial supremacy
as means for holding their weakened political coalitions together.
134
Greater attention to antebellum political practice and the origins in Dred
Scott of the contemporary judicial practice of explicitly declaring federal
laws unconstitutional may not tell us whether Roe was correctly decided.
Nevertheless, just as by not knowing past linguistical practices we have
underestimated the extent of legislative/judicial conflict before the Civil
War, by not being self-conscious about contemporary legal rhetoric, both
opponents and proponents of constitutional protections for abortion rights
may be overestimating legislative/judicial conflicts in the present.
134. See Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exer-
cise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 583, 584-86
(2005).
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